The formal transfer of GNSS under water is not possible. It probably makes sense to talk only about the transformation of GPS into LPS, that is, in the Local Position System. However, the basic methods that are used to solve the problem of Spoofing Detection above water can be used under water. It should be understood that engineering problems are significantly different, since the nature of the propagation of acoustic waves in water and electromagnetic waves in the atmosphere are fundamentally different. In this article, we will limit the navigation with acoustically passive receiver. The receiver "listens" to the buoys and solves the problem of finding its own position based on the coordinates of the buoys (such systems are called GNSS-like Underwater Positioning Systems or GNSS-like UPS). Depending on the scale of system service areas, GNSS-like UPS are divided into global, regional, zonal and local system. In this article, we will limit ourselves to considering only local GNSS-like UPS. The acoustic signal generator transmits a signal simulation of several satellites. If the level of the simulated signal exceeds the signal strength of real satellites, the receiver of UPS will "capture" the fake signal and calculate the false position based on it.
radio channel in real-time mode. Such data exchange allows not only knowing where the robot is and what tasks 48 it solves, but also to continuously control it. The third mode is the easiest. The robot operates completely 49 autonomously and only checks its coordinates with buoys, adjusting the course. In an emergency, the drone can 50
give an SOS signal, reporting the termination of a deep-sea mission. 51
Note the four main methods used in determining underwater positioning, which largely coincide with the 52 methods of measuring the coordinates of mobile objects in radio networks. A GNSS receiver mounted on a buoy is towed on the surface by the underwater targets such as underwater 69 vehicles ( Fig. 1 ). This technique is named as wired underwater GNSS [8, 9] . Positioning accuracy determined 70 by cable length, therefore, this type of positioning is sometimes called the "false" GNSS-like UPS [10] . 71
B. Wireless Buoyant GNSS UPS 72
The wireless (acoustic) buoyant underwater GNSS (Fig. 2 ) also does not give the true position of the target. In 1992, Youngberg inspired a direct transposition of GNSS signal to underwater world [11] [12] (Fig. 3) . 79
Acoustic waves directly go from surface buoys replacing satellites to the underwater receivers. Then, the 80 underwater platform computes its own position locally [13] . 81
The surface buoys determines the XY coordinates (Z = 0) and time T, based on which the receiver of 82 GNSS-like signals determines the own XYZ coordinates. In some applications for an underwater vessel, only 83 the XY coordinates are significant, since the depth Z of the dive can be determined by a depth gauge, so we will 84 focus only on the calculations of the XY coordinates. 85
In this case (2D) without loss of generality (3D) it can be shown that the system of equations (1) 86 (1) describing the relationship of buoy coordinates and UAV coordinates has the following solution (2) 87 Preprints (www.preprints.org) | NOT PEER-REVIEWED | Posted: 5 September 2019 doi:10.20944/preprints201909.0052.v1 
III. From TCP/IP spoofing to the underwater acoustic spoofing 95
The easiest way to mess with a GNSS receiver is to just put in radio interference or create a false noise signal 96 (Jamming), which will be stronger than the real signal. However, in this case, the GNSS receiver simply stops 97 working and the victim switches to INS positioning. In the more "intelligent" Spoofing, the victim does not 98 know that the signal received by the GNSS receiver is incorrect. The spoofer creates a false signal and the 99 victim determines the wrong time and location [14-20]. Initially, the term "spoofing" was used as a term for 100 network security, implying the successful falsification of certain data in order to gain unauthorized access to a At the moment of the victim's capture, the false coordinates coincide with the real ones and then simulate the 124 movement of the victim along a certain trajectory. As a spoofer, we will use an acoustic signal repeater 125 (highlighted in red). It can be shown that by solving the system of equations 126 (3) by analogy with (2) are the coordinates of the spoofer . In this case, the system of equations 127 (4) describing the relationship between the coordinates of buoys, the repeater of acoustic signals and the 128 coordinates of the UAV has the only solution (4) under the condition (Fig. 5 ), that is, all the UAVs 129 that are in the range of the spoofer (acoustic repeater) define their coordinates as . 130
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Moving the mass center of the UAV from the position in position accompanied by random 141 deviations from the route , i.e 142 (8) Suppose a UAV performs underwater circulation of a radius with speed with 143 discretization on time . In this case 144 (9) where ̶ random number uniformly distributed in the interval [0÷1]. 145
When the acoustic signal is low, the circulation is performed normally (Fig. 7) . As the power of the acoustic 146 signal increases, a truncated (limited) circulation is performed ( Fig. 8 ). 
where Ti -measured propagation time of a real signal from a buoy Bi to the victim. 160
The system of equations (10) is written as 161
In the general case, the solution (11) is carried out by numerical methods of minimization (12): 162
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To determine {xv, yv, zv}, there is enough data from three buoys, however, as the software simulation of 163 GNSS-like UPS shows, due to the approximate nature of the measurement of pseudoranges (ρi ≈ cTi,
the positioning accuracy {xv, yv, zv} will depend on the number of buoys N. 165
If the victim uses a barometric depth gauge for determining zv, the system of equations (1) takes the form 166
In this case, the solution (4) (15) To determine the coordinates {xs, ys} there is enough data from three buoys or three GNSS satellites if the 169 spoofer is on the surface of the sea. 170
Suppose we know the victim's coordinates {xv, yv, zv}, for example, using a sonar range finder and a 171 measured direction to the victim. If the victim does not use barometric depth gauge for determining zv, then in 172 this case it is possible to determine the corrections ΔTi for measured time Ti so that the receiver of the victim 173 would calculate the fake coordinates equal to the true ones (16). 174
If the power of the spoofer's signal exceeds the power of the buoys signals, the victim's receiver switches to 175 receiving a false signal. Further, the spoofer applies an escaping spoofing strategy in accordance with the 176 equation system 177
where {Δxv, Δyv, Δzv} -amendment of victim's coordinates, taking away the victim from its route. In this 178 situation, the spoofer is in an active state on the sea surface and the values zi = 0, i.e. correspond to zero sea 179 level. 180
The algorithm of finding ΔTi, N i , 1  with given vectors {xv, yv, zv} and {Δxv, Δyv, Δzv} this article is not 181 considered. 182
VI. Spoofing detection using a single hydrophone 183
In two next sections, we will mainly follow the results obtained in [15, 16, 20] and own research results [17-19, 184 21] and will discuss the two methods of spoofing detection: 185 1) the method of measuring coordinates of a moving victim at two points on the route using a single 186 hydrophone (in this case we use a conventional hydrophone, that is, the problem of practical implementation 187 of spoofing detection of GNSS-like UPS is reduced only to programming); 188 2) the method of measuring coordinates of a victim at two points of space using a dual hydrophone.
We install a fixed single hydrophone on the spoofing detector. Note that the victim may be in motion. 190 A. The measurement of spacing between two positions of the single hydrophone in navigation mode 191
The spoofing detector measures the coordinates of the hydrophone H, based on real signal from buoys: 192
where (xv', yv', zv') -unknown precise coordinates of the hydrophone H at the time t',
coordinates of the hydrophone H at the time t'. 194
The spoofing detector again measures the XYZ of the hydrophone H at the time t": 195
where (xv", yv", zv") -unknown precise coordinates of the hydrophone H at the time t",
calculated coordinates of the hydrophone H at the time t". 197
The measured distance between the hydrophone at the times t' and t" 198
must be commensurate with the distance traveled by the vehicle over time (t" − t), i.e. 199
B. The measurement of spacing between two positions of the single hydrophone in spoofing mode 200
The spoofing detector measures the coordinates of the hydrophones , based on false signal from spoofer: 201 
calculated coordinates of the hydrophone H at the time t". 206
The measured distance between the hydrophone H at the time t' and the hydrophone Y at the time t" 207
because all hydrophones in the spoofing zone calculate the same false coordinates and Note that the spoofing detector may be in motion. During the time Δt = (t" -t'), the parameters of the 215 spoofer's signals may change, therefore solving the problem of optimizing the parameters of the spoofing 216 detector, it is necessary to minimize the parameter Δt. From the point of view of detecting spoofing, it is 217 necessary to maximize the parameter Δt. To resolve this contradiction, minimax methods of parametric 218 optimization are used [22] . Minimax is a kind of backtracking algorithm that is used in decision making and 219 game theory to find the optimal move for a player, assuming that your opponent also plays optimally. It is 220 widely used in two player turn-based games such as Tic-Tac-Toe, Backgammon, Mancala, Chess, etc. 221
VII. Spoofing detection using a dual hydrophone 222
We install a fixed two hydrophones H' and H" on the spoofing detector at distance D from each other. Note that 223 the spoofing detector may be in immobile or in motion. 224
The measurement the distance between hydrophones in navigation mode 225 The spoofing detector measures the coordinates of the hydrophone H': 226
where (xv', yv', zv') -unknown precise coordinates of the hydrophone H', The measured distance between H' and H" is 232
where D -the real distance between hydrophones. 233
A. The measurement the distance between hydrophones in spoofing mode
234 Because all hydrophones in the spoofing zone calculate the same false coordinates the equation (29) 
where D  -discriminant, determined on the basis of statistical studies at the stage of designing a real detection 239 system.
VIII. Conclusions 241
The formal transfer of GNSS under water is not possible. It probably makes sense to talk only about the 242 transformation of GPS into LPS, that is, in the Local Position System. However, the basic methods that are used 243 to solve the problem of Spoofing Detection above water can be used under water. It should be understood that 244 engineering problems are significantly different, since the nature of the propagation of acoustic waves in water 245 and electromagnetic waves in the atmosphere are fundamentally different. 246
